How long can the Central Banks' divergence last

AUTHORS

MAHMOOD PRADHAN

HEAD OF GLOBAL MACROECONOMICS -AMUNDI INVESTMENT INSTITUTE

FEDERICO CESARINI

HEAD OF DM FX STRATEGY -AMUNDI INVESTMENT INSTITUTE

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The divergence of Central Bank policy rates is unlikely to significantly impact exchange rates, as other core currencies are not weak relative to recent history and market expectations of terminal rates in Europe are similar to those in the US.

Global financial conditions are strongly influenced by US longend yields, and there is a risk of the term premium rising if US deficit and debt projections deteriorate.

Although not in our baseline scenario, an energy supply and price shock would weaken European exchange rates and rapidly transmit to domestic inflation.


Central Bank policy rates can diverge.

The pace of disinflation in most advanced economies is following a similar path, albeit with differences in sticky components. Central bank policy rates are unlikely to diverge significantly (our baseline), but this does not rule out the ECB and the BoE cutting rates faster than the Fed, especially given their weaker growth outlook. The impact of this scenario would be steeper yield curves in the Eurozone and the UK, but not substantially weaker exchange rates, as some fear. A bigger risk to European exchange rates stems from (unanticipated) energy price shocks rather than lower relative interest rates. We explore why.

The US dollar has been exceptionally strong, but other core currencies (except the Yen) have also been strong in trade-weighted terms.

The global macro backdrop – inflation scares, geopolitical tensions and recession worries – together with US economic resilience, have supported the dollar versus core currencies, but the latter are not weak relative to recent history. Moreover, the difference in market expectations of terminal rates in Europe are now substantially higher than before the pandemic, and not materially different from expected US terminal rates. This should limit any sustained weakness in European exchange rates.


Core currencies outperformed in trade-weighted terms



Source: Amundi Investment Institute, Bloomberg. Date as of 12 July 2024.

Fears about exchange rate depreciation are overdone.

When Central Bank policy rates diverge, there are typically two main risks that may make rate cuts unsustainable: 1) exchange rate depreciation and 2) inflation pass-through from exchange rate depreciation. While monetary policy rate differentials matter, both risk factors seem less of a worry in this cycle. First, exchange rate volatility has been unusually low, despite the Fed becoming incrementally hawkish in 2024 relative to most other Central Banks. US disinflation has allowed the Fed to maintain its bias towards cuts, which has contained both the distribution of expected inflation and forward US rates.



Source: Amundi Investment Institute, Bloomberg. Date as of 12 July 2024. USD implied policy rate advantage = US expected policy rate - G10FX policy rates (using DXY constituents' weights), where policy rate is the average between 6M, 12M, and 2Y.


Second, the inflation pass-through of exchange rate depreciation is estimated to be relatively low (around 0.10 percentage points for a 1 percentage exchange rate point depreciation in the Euro Area). A related third factor is that the ECB and the BoE are not easing their restrictive policy stances in response to a growth shock. Such support for growth would, over time, strengthen their exchange rates. Fourth, the absolute level of yields matters. Euro and UK terminal rates are expected to be substantially higher than pre-pandemic levels.

Policy rate divergence would, however, imply steeper yield curves in Europe.

Global financial conditions at the long end are strongly influenced by US long-end yields (primarily reflecting the size of US markets), particularly since the pandemic.

far, alobal markets benefitted from the absence of any substantial term premium in the US because policy rates have been expected to fall (with inflation) and the US is continuing to attract foreign capital. But there is a significant risk that the term premium could rise over the medium term, possibly by a significant amount, if the US deficit and debt projections continue to deteriorate. This is the real risk that European Central Banks will have to manage: a much steeper yield curve than would materialise from going a little faster with rate cuts. Moreover, the absolute level of yields also matters.

European 10Y yields correlation with US 10Y



Source: Amundi Investment Institute, Bloomberg. Data as of 12 July 2024.

With the end of QE and the era of negative-yielding government debt outside the US, **higher US yield levels will likely have larger spillovers.** Any substantial and sharp rise in the US term premium, perhaps due to market concerns about debt issuance and fiscal paralysis in the US, could in turn also have **strong FX effects.** Here we would worry about low-yielding currencies, such as the Yen.

Although it's not our baseline, another energy shock would also impact exchange rates. Our baseline sees oil and gas prices on a gradual and slow downward trajectory. But an energy supply and price shock would weaken European exchange rates and rapidly transmit to domestic inflation. As most commodities are priced in US Dollars, the resilience of trade-weighted exchange rates would not help contain imported inflation.

AII* CONTRIBUTORS

SERGIO BERTONCINI

SENIOR FIXED INCOME STRATEGIST

POL CARULLA

INVESTMENT INSIGHTS AND CLIENT DIVISION SPECIALIST

UJJWAL DHINGRA

INVESTMENT INSIGHTS AND CLIENT DIVISION SPECIALIST

SILVIA DI SILVIO

CROSS ASSET MACRO STRATEGIST

PATRYK DROZDIK

SENIOR EM MACRO STRATEGIST

DELPHINE GEORGES

SENIOR FIXED INCOME STRATEGIST

KARINE HERVÉ

SENIOR EM MACRO STRATEGIST

SOSI VARTANESYAN

SENIOR SOVEREIGN ANALYST

DESIGN & DATA VISUALIZATION

CHIARA BENETTI

DIGITAL ART DIRECTOR AND STRATEGY DESIGNER, AII *

VINCENT FLASSEUR

GRAPHICS AND DATA VISUALIZATION MANAGER, AII*

CHIEF EDITORS

MONICA DEFEND

HEAD OF AMUNDI INVESTMENT INSTITUTE

VINCENT MORTIER

GROUP CIO

MATTEO GERMANO

DEPUTY GROUP CTO

EDITORS

CLAUDIA BERTINO

HEAD OF AMUNDI INVESTMENT INSIGHTS AND PUBLISHING, AII*

LAURA FIOROT

HEAD OF INVESTMENT INSIGHTS & CLIENT DIVISION, AII*

DEPUTY EDITORS

GIANLUCA GALLARATE

INVESTMENT INSIGHTS & PUBLISHING, AII*

FRANCESCA PANELLI

INVESTMENT INSIGHTS & CLIENT DIVISION SPECIALIST, AII*

* Amundi Investment Institute

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

This document is solely for informational purposes.

This document does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation of any security or any other product or service. Any securities, products, or services referenced may not be registered for sale with the relevant authority in your jurisdiction and may not be regulated or supervised by any governmental or similar authority in your jurisdiction.

Any information contained in this document may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or redisseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices.

Furthermore, nothing in this document is intended to provide tax, legal, or investment advice.

Unless otherwise stated, all information contained in this document is from Amundi Asset Management SAS and is as of 25 July 2024. Diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against a loss. This document is provided on an "as is" basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The views expressed regarding market and economic trends are those of the author and not necessarily Amundi Asset Management SAS and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions, and there can be no assurance that countries, markets or sectors will perform as expected. These views should not be relied upon as investment advice, a security recommendation, or as an indication of trading for any Amundi product. Investment involves risks, including market, political, liquidity and currency risks.

Furthermore, in no event shall any person involved in the production of this document have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including, without limitation, lost profits) or any other damages.

Date of first use: 26 July 2024.

Document issued by Amundi Asset Management, "société par actions simplifiée"- SAS with a capital of €1,143,615,555 - Portfolio manager regulated by the AMF under number GP04000036 - Head office: 90-93 boulevard Pasteur - 75015 Paris - France - 437 574 452 RCS Paris - www.amundi.com

Photo credit: ©iStock/Getty Images Plus – GibsonPictures.

Amundi Investment Institute

In an increasing complex and changing world, investors need to better understand their environment and the evolution of investment practices in order to define their asset allocation and help construct their portfolios.

This environment spans across economic, financial, geopolitical, societal and environmental dimensions. To help meet this need, Amundi has created the Amundi Investment Institute. This independent research platform brings together Amundi's research, market strategy, investment themes and asset allocation advisory activities under one umbrella; the Amundi Investment Institute. Its aim is to produce and disseminate research and Thought Leadership publications which anticipate and innovate for the benefit of investment teams and clients alike.

