GEOPOLITICS

'The Great Diversification' is underway

We are now firmly in the riskier, messier, more factious world we <u>predicted</u>. While the US president is not the cause of the geopolitical shifts underway over the last few years, his administration is accelerating some drivers. For example, tariffs are intensifying economic friction, while the reduction of US commitments to Europe's security and ambitions in space are contributing to a new arms race. The US, under Trump, has also emerged as an additional disruptor.

Geopolitics is changing the macro and market environment

As investors, we need to look at geopolitical risk like we look at debt. High debt levels do not need to result in a debt crisis, but they increase vulnerabilities. Geopolitics is also changing the macro and market environment. The current level of US domestic political uncertainty alongside geopolitical risk alters how companies, consumers, and investors make decisions, which then has economic, and again political, implications. This uncertain backdrop will shape the next twelve months.

Politics will continue to hit global investors where they are most exposed: in US assets. Concerns over the US's fiscal position will linger, alongside doubts over how the US will weather the changes underway. **Domestic politics will remain volatile** as Trump will double down on societal issues that rally the MAGA base as mid-term elections approach.

After Trump's tariff ambitions faced pushback from financial markets and the courts, many leaders will be reluctant to cede much ground in negotiations. This will likely cause **more tariff-related pressure**. Negotiations will take time and trigger retaliation, if unsuccessful. Our current economic assumptions are based on an average US tariff rate of 15%, but this rate is likely to remain in flux.

Governments, companies, and investors will diversify away from the US

As a result, 'The Great Diversification' will play out as governments, companies, and investors diversify away from the US. Governments will seek to sign new trade and security deals while central banks will continue to diversify their currency reserves. Companies will wait to see how tariff negotiations play out to decide how to adjust their supply chains and final manufacturing destinations and how to get away with doing the bare minimum to satisfy Trump's demands for on-shoring in the US.

The diversification trend is playing out across asset classes & geographies

- Central bank reserve managers expect the share of the USD in global reserves to fall to around 55% in the next decade, while the renminbi's share is expected to increase to 5.6% (OMFIF).
- The renminbi has now surpassed the USD in China's cross-border transactions.
- Payment systems and platforms bypassing the USD and SWIFT are mushrooming in Asia and are being developed by BRICS members.
- Gold prices are at an all-time high.
- Demand for Eurozone bonds has been steadily increasing while European assets are attracting more capital flows.
- 64% of Chinese FDI was allocated to emerging markets in 2024, but 53.2% of China's investment in high-income countries was allocated to Europe.

Winners and losers' will not be clear until tariff negotiations and the re-routing process are completed but Europe is likely to remain a net winner from US uncertainty. While political risks remain, Europe is growing more united, as leaders understand they are stronger together than as individual member states. Improving EU-UK ties is a case in point. Upcoming elections in Hungary in April 2026 could also bring a power shift, possibly removing one of the EU's biggest political hurdles as Viktor Orbán's party is trailing in the polls. The EU is amplifying its trade relations, as recent deals with the UK and Mercosur, and progress on a trade deal with India, illustrate. There is momentum towards single and financial market integration and creating an environment that could make the euro more attractive.

However, the EU will have to provide more clarity on how spending needs (e.g. defence, infrastructure, technology) will be funded despite constrained fiscal space. Reforms and reducing bureaucracy are essential to further integration, **but political hurdles are abundant**.

While political risks remain, Europe is growing more united, as leaders understand they are stronger together than as individual member states.

Developments in the Russia-Ukraine war will only emphasise the need for Europe to step up its own defence. A continuation of the conflict alongside talks is the most likely scenario for the next several months. Putin's and Ukraine's war aims do not overlap and there is no easy landing zone. If a ceasefire is achieved, it most likely will leave the door open for further Russian military activity. Most scenarios lead to Europe having to do the heavy lifting for its own and Ukraine's security.

The US-China relationship will continue to decline for as long as China poses a strategic economic, military and technological threat to the US. Our analysis comparing the US and China in various categories ranging from technology to industrial and military capabilities suggests that China is 'catching up' with the US in many areas and leading in others (e.g. rare earths). Some of Trump's actions, like undermining research institutions and expelling migrants, are eroding some of the US's competitive advantages over China: attractive demographics and research innovation.

The US and China will likely stay in a scenario of 'tense understanding' for the next several months. Both sides will avoid further escalation but also accept that the Great Power Competition does not allow much space for ties to improve significantly. The US will continue to try and squeeze China economically, meaning there is a low likelihood of a grand bargain, which would see tariff levels come down sharply. This doesn't mean there could not be 'mini deals' – for example, even if fentanyl tariffs come down as part of talks, the US would likely impose additional tariffs or export controls in other areas to maintain economic pressure. China in turn is growing more confident on the global stage, openly challenging the US, as recent deals in the US's 'backyard' – Latin America – demonstrate.

The Middle East will continue to see significant changes, but much will depend on how the recent escalation between Iran and Israel develops. There are various scenarios, one in which diplomacy resumes as Iran realises its regime stands the best chance of surviving by seeking a deal. There is a range of escalation possibilities, with Iran retaliating, kicking off a broader regional war involving other powers and the US. Israel may also decide that now is the time to force political change in Iran once and for all. At the time of writing, our view is that diplomacy will likely resume after retaliations between Iran and Israel play out.

Despite sanctions relief, **Syria** will remain volatile given the difficult domestic situation and various competing geopolitical interests. Equally, the ceasefire with the Houthis will remain fragile, sustaining concerns for shipping in the Red Sea.

We expected **Saudi Arabia** to have more political influence in the region under Trump and this has played out. While Saudi Arabia fears Iran, the Gulf is first and foremost interested in political stability to achieve its economic objectives.

AUTHORS

CHIEF EDITORS



MONICA DEFEND HEAD OF AMUNDI INVESTMENT INSTITUTE



VINCENT MORTIER GROUP CIO



PHILIPPE D'ORGEVAL DEPUTY GROUP CIO

EDITORS



CLAUDIA BERTINO HEAD OF INVESTMENT INSIGHTS, PUBLISHING AND CLIENT DEVELOPMENT, AII*



LAURA FIOROT HEAD OF INVESTMENT INSIGHTS & CLIENT DIVISION. AII*



SWAHA
PATTANAIK
HEAD OF PUBLISHING
AND DIGITAL
STRATEGY, AII*

AUTHORS

VALENTINE AINOUZ

HEAD OF GLOBAL FIXED INCOME STRATEGY, AII*

ALESSIA BERARDI

HEAD OF EMERGING MACRO STRATEGY, AII*

JEAN-BAPTISTE BERTHON

SENIOR INVESTMENT STRATEGIST, AII*

DIDIER BOROWSKI

HEAD OF MACRO POLICY RESEARCH, AII*

FEDERICO CESARINI

HEAD OF DM FX STRATEGY, AII*

DEBORA DELBÒ

SENIOR EM MACRO STRATEGIST, AII*

CLAIRE HUANG

SENIOR EM MACRO STRATEGIST, AII*

ERIC MIJOT

HEAD OF GLOBAL EQUITY STRATEGY, AII*

LORENZO PORTELLI

HEAD OF CROSS ASSET STRATEGY, AII*

MAHMOOD PRADHAN

HEAD OF GLOBAL MACROECONOMICS, AII*

ANNA ROSENBERG

HEAD OF GEOPOLITICS, AII*

GUY STEAR

HEAD OF DEVELOPED MARKETS STRATEGY, AII*

AYUSH TAMBI

SENIOR EQUITY STRATEGIST, AII*

ANNALISA USARDI, CFA

SENIOR ECONOMIST, HEAD OF ADVANCED ECONOMY MODELLING, AII*

DESIGN & DATA VISUALIZATION

CHIARA BENETTI

DIGITAL ART DIRECTOR AND STRATEGY DESIGNER, AII *

VINCENT FLASSEUR

GRAPHICS AND DATA VISUALIZATION MANAGER, AII*

DEPUTY EDITOR

CY CROSBY TREMMEL

INVESTMENT INSIGHTS SPECIALIST, AII*

LEADERSHIP TEAM

DOMINIQUE CARREL-BILLIARD

HEAD OF REAL & ALTERNATIVE ASSETS

AMAURY D'ORSAY

HEAD OF FIXED INCOME

BARRY GLAVIN

HEAD OF EQUITIES

JOHN O'TOOLE

HEAD OF MULTI-ASSET INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS

FRANCESCO SANDRINI

HEAD OF MULTI-ASSET STRATEGIES

YERLAN SYZDYKOV

GLOBAL HEAD OF EMERGING MARKETS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We also would like to thank Mickael Bellaiche, Sergio Bertoncini, Pierre Brousse, Pol Carulla, Ujjwal Dhingra, Silvia Di Silvio, Patryk Drozdzik, Delphine Georges, Lauren Stagnol.

Always get the latest data

View the digital version of this document, scan the code with your smartphone or CLICK HERE







Trust must be earned

Amundi Investment Institute



In an increasing complex and changing world, investors need to better understand their environment and the evolution of investment practices in order to define their asset allocation and help construct their portfolios.

This environment spans across economic, financial, geopolitical, societal and environmental dimensions. To help meet this need, Amundi has created the Amundi Investment Institute. This independent research platform brings together Amundi's research, market strategy, investment themes and asset allocation advisory activities under one umbrella; the Amundi Investment Institute. Its aim is to produce and disseminate research and Thought Leadership publications which anticipate and innovate for the benefit of investment teams and clients alike.





Trust must be earned

DEFINITION ABBREVIATIONS

Currency abbreviations: USD – US dollar, BRL – Brazilian real, JPY – Japanese yen, GBP – British pound sterling, EUR – Euro, CAD – Canadian dollar, SEK – Swedish krona, NOK – Norwegian krone, CHF – Swiss Franc, NZD – New Zealand dollar, AUD – Australian dollar, CNY – Chinese Renminbi, CLP – Chilean Peso, MXN – Mexican Peso, IDR – Indonesian Rupiah, RUB – Russian Ruble, ZAR – South African Rand, TRY – Turkish lira, KRW – South Korean Won, THB – Thai Baht, HUF – Hungarian Forint, COP – Columbian Peso.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. None of the MSCI information is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision and may not be relied on as such. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or quarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The MSCI information is provided on an "as is" basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. MSCI, each of its affiliates and each other person involved in or related to compiling, computing or creating any MSCI information (collectively, the "MSCI Parties") expressly disclaims all warranties (including, without limitation, any warranty of originality, accuracy, completeness, timeliness, non-infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose) with respect to this information. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall any MSCI Party have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including, without limitation, lost profits) or any other damages. (www.mscibarra.com). The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) SM was developed by and is the exclusive property and a service mark of Standard & Poor's and MSCI. Neither Standard & Poor's, MSCI nor any other party involved in making or compiling any GICS classifications makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such standard or classification (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such standard or classification. Without limiting any of the forgoing, in no event shall Standard & Poor's, MSCI, any of their affiliates or any third party involved in making or compiling any GICS classification have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages.

This document is solely for informational purposes. This document does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation of any security or any other product or service. Any securities, products, or services referenced may not be registered for sale with the relevant authority in your jurisdiction and may not be regulated or supervised by any governmental or similar authority in your jurisdiction. Any information contained in this document may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or redisseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. Furthermore, nothing in this document is intended to provide tax, legal, or investment advice. Unless otherwise stated, all information contained in this document is from Amundi Asset Management S.A.S. and is as of 16 June 2025. Diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against a loss. This document is provided on an "as is" basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or quarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The views expressed regarding market and economic trends are those of the author and not necessarily Amundi Asset Management S.A.S. and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions, and there can be no assurance that countries, markets or sectors will perform as expected. These views should not be relied upon as investment advice, a security recommendation, or as an indication of trading for any Amundi product. Investment involves risks, including market, political, liquidity and currency risks. Furthermore, in no event shall Amundi have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including, without limitation, lost profits) or any other damages due to its use. Date of first use: 17 June 2025

Document issued by Amundi Asset Management, "société par actions simplifiée"- SAS with a capital of €1,143,615,555 - Portfolio manager regulated by the AMF under number GP04000036 - Head office: 91-93 boulevard Pasteur, 75015 Paris - France - 437 574 452 RCS Paris - www.amundi.com.

DOC ID: 4588037

Cover image by Per Breiehagen @Gettyimages
Additional images: Istockphoto @ GettyImages: bluejayphoto, Kesu01, Paulo Hoeper, poco_bw, Sanjay Dey / EyeEm
Amundi Investment Institute photo by Marco Bottigelli @Gettyimages
Icons from TheNounProject.com