

Risk factors

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The table below presents risk factors with probabilities assigned. It also develops the most credible market impacts.

| | | |
|--|--------------------|--|
| Risk # 1 | 75% probability | The post-Brexit environment permanently weakens the UK |
| <p>Analysis According to estimates, the UK “could lose” between 2.5% and 9.5% of its GDP in the medium term (depending on the nature of the Brexit). Volume and costs of trade would be affected, especially in the financial services, chemicals and automotive sectors, which are highly integrated sectors in the European Union. The risk for the UK lies in its future ability to trade freely in the single market (the services market, to be more precise), to achieve the desired independence without the EU’s constraints. This is the challenge of the negotiations on trade which have hardly started. There are many issues of tension, not just between the UK and countries in the EU, but within the British government itself. The risk of political instability (fall of government, new elections) in 2018 should not be underestimated.</p> <p>Market impact Even though the likelihood of a hard Brexit has significantly dropped, and although some pressure has been relieved with the transition period (until the end of 2020), negotiations on trade are expected to be tense. In the event that the outcome is ultimately unfavourable for the UK, we will see additional weakening of the pound sterling and trend-GDP growth of the British economy, two factors that could prolong the monetary status quo.</p> | | |
| Risk # 2 | 75% probability | Greater financial instability |
| <p>Analysis Central banks have made the return of financial stability possible in recent years through lower rates, short and long; maintaining interest rates at low levels across the board; low volatility, tighter credit spreads and the virtual disappearance of sovereign risks in some cases. However, central banks are now determined to recalibrate their policies, despite the recent rebound in volatility. The macroeconomic response to a potential downturn in activity would ultimately come from fiscal and tax policies, and traditionally public spending has far less stabilising power for financial markets than interest rate cuts.</p> <p>Market impact Greater financial instability would result in a more pronounced rise in volatility across all financial markets and an increase in credit spreads.</p> | | |
| Risk # 3 | 70% probability | Political and geopolitical risks maintained |
| <p>Analysis Financial markets are now operating against a complex geopolitical backdrop: Syria, Islamic State, Turkey, migrant flows, terrorist attacks, Sunnis vs. Shiites, Arabia vs. Iran. On the one hand, the situation has dramatically eased in Asia with the rapprochement of the two Koreas and the promise of denuclearization of the North Korean leader. On the other hand, the situation in the Middle East has worsened with regard to the Iranian issue (threats of denunciation by the United States of the JCPOA agreement signed in 2015, with a resumption of sanctions against Iran and, as a consequence, the resumption of the nuclear program in Iran). Do not expect a quick resolution of ongoing problems and conflicts. In order to take into account political and geopolitical risks into portfolio constructions on a permanent basis, it is necessary to systematically consider macro-hedging strategies.</p> <p>Market impact There will be regular spikes in tension and volatility. The current geopolitical risks are well identified but many and, by their nature, materialize as often unpredictably. Other political risks (including the consequences of the new US diplomacy) are more difficult to assess at this stage. Is this all likely to affect growth prospects and the direction of financial markets? No one really knows it but it is very likely that this is the case, at least occasionally.</p> | | |
| Risk # 4 | 20% probability | A long-term and significant increase in European long rates |
| <p>Analysis The increase in long-term rates can come from at least six sources: (i) a significant upswing in (nominal, real or potential) growth prospects, (ii) more aggressive tightening of interest rate policies, (iii) the “true” end of QEs (the end of reinvesting maturing papers in the US, an even more drastic reduction in the ECB’s asset purchasing programme), (iv) a resurgence of inflation or inflation expectations, (v) a massive reversal of fiscal and tax policies, or (vi) a resurgence of specific political risks. All these factors (reality, announced measures, or fears) have gained momentum in the United States, but it seems premature to expect a substantial increase in bond yields.</p> | | |

This conclusion is particularly valid in the case of the Eurozone, where the ECB intends to maintain very accommodative monetary conditions this year and next. This is indeed a necessary condition for inflation to recover gradually. However, the desire to lower the degree of monetary accommodation - including ending QE - remains intact. A moderate rise in European interest rates seems inevitable. But a marked increase is unlikely.

Market impact | A sharp rise in long rates would be bad news in the United States, where the sensitivity of the economy to long-term rates has increased with corporate releveraging: this would weaken growth and in itself would sow the seeds for a future decline in long rates. It should also be noted that a sharp rise in long-term rates would stop the rate hikes from the Fed. Another reason not to believe in a long-lasting and wide rise in US and European long-term rates.

Risk # 5

20%
probability**Pro-cyclical fiscal policy pushes the Fed to raise its rates more quickly than expected**

Analysis | The expansionist budgetary policy (tax cuts and increase in public spending) will boost GDP growth in 2018. With GDP growth well above 2% inflation that is likely to exceed 2% on average this year and an economy that is close to full employment (with a positive output gap), the real fed funds rate should be much higher than it is now, in a normal cycle. So, technically, the Fed is “behind the curve”. The Fed must clearly avoid any communication errors. Markets could react poorly if rates surge. The most recent example of a bond crash dates back to February 1994 and was triggered by a 25bp increase in rates (not prepared). However, we note that the short-term positive impact of the budgetary policy should allow the Fed to continue to raise interest rates without increasing the risk of recession and, as such, without damaging the financial markets.

Market impact | If the Fed steps up its rate increases, we will have to bet on a sharp downturn in equities and on contagion into the emerging markets. This situation would be conducive to a widening of spreads between Europe and the US. We expect two more rate hikes from the Fed by the end of the year. All it would take is for core inflation or wages to pick up more quickly (with still strong growth) to open the door to further rate hikes.

Risk # 6

15%
probability**Global trade war**

Analysis | The tax increases announced by Donald Trump - if they are actually implemented - will provoke retaliation from trading partners (EU, Canada, China, Korea, etc.). It is likely that Donald Trump's threat is primarily a weapon in renegotiating the NAFTA agreements with Mexico and Canada, as well as a message sent to his electoral base in the run-up to the mid-term elections (November). Retaliation of targeted partners could lead to further protectionist measures by the White House and thus provoke a chain reaction. Although the probability that the measures announced are actually implemented is not non-negligible, that of a chain reaction seems quite limited for two reasons: (1) many sectors in the US would be victims of retaliation which would be counterproductive before the mid-term elections (strong opposition already perceptible in the Republican camp); (2) partner countries will be careful not to fall into the trap set and maintain a measured response. That said, we cannot ignore the risk of a generalized clash, especially as the moderate camp at the White House (favourable to free trade) is very weakened.

Market impact | A chain reaction would cause a slump in global trade while exacerbating local inflationary pressures, putting central banks in a corner. This would cause a general rise in risk aversion (fear of a reversal of the global cycle). Contrary to what Trump asserts, there is never a winner in a confrontation of this type. There are only losers.

Risk # 7

10%
probability**A Chinese “hard landing”
/ a bursting of the credit bubble / devaluation of the yuan**

Analysis | Chinese growth is still solid (and more resilient than many market observers believed on year ago), but the country's economic model is fragile: the excess of credit is visible, non-financial corporate debt has surged since the GFC. The good news is that it has peaked: the NFC debt to GDP ratio has started to drop in late 2017. This development bodes well for the future. We will continue to monitor closely the trend in Chinese private debt that currently benefits from the strength of nominal GDP. In the case of hard landing or the bursting of the credit bubble, the Chinese authorities would be unable to maintain the stability of the Yuan, especially since the Chinese currency is no longer undervalued.

Market impact | A hard landing linked to a burst of the credit bubble would have a very negative impact and its cascading effects would be particularly disastrous: vulnerability of banking systems (in China and elsewhere), vulnerability of the global financial system, vulnerability linked to China's public and private debt, negative impact on regional and global trade, and thus on commodities and emerging countries, impacts on the currencies of commodity-exporting countries, advanced countries and emerging countries.

MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT

Our convictions and our scenarios

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This section provides a reminder of our central scenario and alternative scenarios.

Central scenario (70% probability): global growth is stabilising.

- **Continued expansion of global activity:** surveys, despite their recent deterioration, remain at high levels, mostly well above their long-term average. Global growth is expected to remain strong in 2018 and 2019. The advanced economies (with the notable exception of the UK) will continue to experience above potential growth. The major emerging economies will also continue to grow at a sustained pace. The ongoing rebalancing in China is progressing quietly. The recovery in most economies is being driven by domestic demand with a positive contribution from investment in many areas simultaneously. The synchronous nature of expansion makes it more robust.
- **World trade:** world trade remained robust in Q1 2018 (+5.4% year-on-year) but seems to have lost some strength at the end of the quarter and at the beginning of Q2. The protectionist measures announced by Donald Trump on steel and aluminium (tariff increases) were once again postponed (to 1 June). If implemented, they will give rise to retaliatory measures (from the EU and China in particular) that will be damaging to trade. We observe that this threat has begun to weigh on the confidence of business leaders (uncertainty about the outlook), particularly in Europe. However, it should be kept in mind that the products being targeted account for a small share of world trade and partner retaliation is targeted at a few products. We continue to expect a slight decline in the world trade to global GDP ratio (i.e., trade growth slightly below that of global GDP). The probability of a real global trade war is low (see risk scenario).
- **United States:** growth came out slightly above expectations in Q1 and is expected to pick up. Surveys still point to GDP growth above potential. The fiscal stimulus voted in December, combined with the bi-partisan plan to increase public spending, will extend the duration of the US cycle. There is no recession to fear in 2018 or 2019.
- **Eurozone:** growth slowed down in Q1 and surveys declined sometimes quite sharply, albeit from historically high levels. This easing of growth does not come as a surprise after a highly robust end to 2017. The rising euro and tensions over trade likely had a negative impact. These developments confirm that the growth peak is behind us. We are expecting a slight slowdown in 2018 and again in 2019, although growth is expected to remain well above its potential. The Eurozone is in fact at mid-cycle, with the prospect of catching up for peripheral countries. The ECB has also promised to maintain its accommodative monetary policy. Furthermore, the perception of political risk has weakened significantly. It has not disappeared completely but has become more local. Specifically, the political situation in Italy remains unclear and new elections cannot be ruled out. However, local tensions are not enough to jeopardise the strengthening of the eurozone that the French and German governments are in the process of negotiating, ahead of the European Council meeting in late June.
- **United Kingdom:** EU countries and the UK are in the process of concluding an agreement for a transition period (limited in time until the end of 2020). But the dissensions on Brexit terms are still strong on the fact of remaining or not in the Customs Union. Uncertainty will continue to weigh on the UK economy, but in a more diffuse way. We expect growth to remain below potential in 2018-2019. The BoE prefers to wait a little longer before raising rates.
- **China:** growth is robust and the transition is under control. The reduction in overcapacity has reduced the downside risks. The economy's growth drivers are now more diversified. Debt, essentially domestic has stabilised. We expect the gradual deceleration of growth to continue and a slow rebalancing (less growth, less debt).
- **Inflation:** core inflation, which is low at this stage in the cycle (especially in advanced economies), is expected to recover gradually in 2018. That said, the slowdown in inflation over recent years is primarily structural (tied to supply factors), while the cyclical component of inflation has weakened (flattening of the Phillips curve). While the pick-up in core inflation promises to be modest, the likelihood of an "inflation surprise" is nonetheless increasing as surplus capacities disappear around the world (we estimate that the global output gap will close in 2018 for the first time since the great financial crisis). The risk is easier to spot in the US (we expect wages to continue to accelerate), given how close the economy is to full employment and how certain temporary factors (such as the drop in mobile phone service prices in the spring of 2017) have disappeared, which will automatically push inflation upward at the end of Q1 2018 (base effect).
- **Oil prices:** oil prices have increased sharply (\$75 a barrel for Brent) and are at their highest level in 4 years. This rise is due to tensions in the Middle East (especially in terms of the uncertain future of the agreement over Iran's nuclear activities),

relatively low inventory in the United States and high global demand. Short-term risks are to the upside. However, we have not revised our breakeven price assumption (of around \$60), which we expect to reach within 12 months.

- **Central banks will continue to whittle down their accommodative monetary policy.** The Fed will continue to raise its key interest rates (we anticipate two additional 25bp hikes by the end of the year, maybe three if growth and inflation surprise to the upside) and reduce its balance sheet at the announced pace (with a gradual non-replacement of papers reaching maturity); meanwhile, the ECB could put an end to its QE programme as soon as Q4 2018. However, its rhetoric remains particularly accommodating. The end of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) is contingent on a rise in core inflation, which remains very low at this stage of the cycle. Forward guidance remains unchanged: the ECB will not begin to raise rates until “well after” the end of the APP. This implies that any increase in the deposit rate would not take place until at least mid-2019.

The protectionist measures announced by Donald Trump are dragging down confidence, especially in Europe. However, we believe that the risks to growth are now balanced. The likelihood of a widespread trade war remains low because the measures on the table (from Donald Trump and the retaliatory measures) will ultimately target products that account for a small share of world trade. Furthermore, it seems that the retaliatory measures being planned by the EU are making Donald Trump hesitate, causing him to once again postpone the implementation (until 1 June) of his tariffs on steel and aluminium.



Downside risk scenario (15% probability): marked economic slowdown due to incorrect economic policy (excessively quick monetary policy normalisation or protectionist measures), a geopolitical crisis or a sudden repricing of risk premiums.

- The risk of increasing protectionist measures (US) rises with the approach of the mid-term elections (Trump seeking to satisfy his electoral base). Retaliation from the rest of the world would be inevitable, provoking an open trade war (US, China, EU).
- The pro-cyclical fiscal policy forces the Fed to accelerate the monetary policy normalisation process.
- Aggravation of current geopolitical tensions in the Middle East.

Consequences:

- All things being equal, a global trade war would be negative for growth and, in the short term, would prove inflationary.
- An abrupt re-evaluation of risks on the fixed income markets, with a global decompression of spreads (govies and credit, on the developed and emerging markets alike). Decline in market liquidity.
- With the resulting financial turbulence, the theme of the end of the cycle resurfaces brutally in the US.
- Central banks cease recalibrating their monetary policies and, in the most extreme case, resort to unconventional tools (expanding their balance sheets).



Upside risk scenario (15% probability): pick-up in global growth in 2018.

Several factors, which are likely to generate higher growth, should be closely monitored:

- Sharp pick-up driven by business investment, global trade, and synchronisation of the overall cycle.
- In a very promising environment, the pro-cyclical US tax policy generates a stronger than expected pick-up in domestic growth in the US. Growth is picking up again in the eurozone after a soft patch in Q1. Stabilisation in China, confirmation of the trend in Japan, etc.
- Central banks react late, maintaining excessively accommodative monetary conditions, hence a “mini boom”.

Consequences:

- A marked pick-up in global growth for the second consecutive year would increase inflation expectations, forcing the central banks to consider normalising their monetary policy much more quickly.
- Rise in real key interest rates (in the US especially).
- Given the resulting financial turbulence, the mini-boom would not last long. There would be a greater risk of a boom/bust (i.e. the bust after the boom).

Macroeconomic picture by area

United States

Risk factors

Economy set to expand above potential after Q1 temporary weakness

- While indicators point to softer first quarter activity data, the economic outlook for the year remains solid.
- Domestic demand still posed to be strong: business and consumer surveys show very upbeat sentiment in aggregate, although moderating from the highs. Further improvements in labour market and disposable income, lifted also by the tax-cuts positive effects, support consumption while strong sales and only modestly rising production costs allow for healthy dynamics in corporate profits.
- A slower than usual inflation generation process in the U.S. economy has produced a gradual convergence of core inflation to the Fed's target and current economic conditions support the possibility of a modest overshoot. Headline inflation will be instead higher than core on annual basis, yet remaining on check. Risks tilted to the upside.
- Two more hikes from the Fed now expected, based on this economic backdrop. One additional hike could be in the cards, should inflation surprise on the upside.

- Stronger acceleration of wage inflationary pressures
- Abrupt and protracted tightening of financial conditions
- Unpredictability of U.S. Trade Policies and risks of escalated retaliations impact confidence an real economy
- Geopolitical risks linked to a more hawkish shift of the U.S. Administration (Iran, North Korea)

Eurozone

Despite a series of disappointing figures in Q1, the recovery will continue.

- Business climate indicators and a number of hard data sharply disappointed in Q1. The rising euro, uncertainties related to world trade and other temporary factors weighed on activity after the peak of late 2017. However, the recovery should continue, supported by strong internal drivers (consumption, investment, less restrictive fiscal policies and less political risk than in 2017). Underlying inflation remains weak but should increase slightly in the coming months
- Italian political uncertainty does not carry an immediate systemic risk to the Eurozone. Under the impulse of the German-French couple, institutional changes aimed at improving the robustness of the Eurozone's financial architecture will probably be decided before the 2017 European elections.

- Rise in anti-establishment parties
- Overreaction by the euro
- External risks

United Kingdom

The job market provides an important support despite the Brexit uncertainty

- The weak Q1 GDP growth figure (+0.1%) underestimates the real trend. Brexit-related uncertainty remains detrimental to business confidence. However, job market figures are strong (the unemployment rate reached a new low at 4.2% in February. Nominal wages are increasing while real wages are back in positive territory thanks to the slight decrease in inflation.
- The agreement reached in March with the EU on a transition period after the UK leaves the Union (from March 2019 to end 2020) has not removed all the obstacles to a "soft Brexti". However, this is now by far the most likely scenario, with even a significant probability that the UK will remain in the EU's customs union.

- A hard Brexit
- The current account deficit remains very high

Japan

Pace of growth will be inevitably slower, though still above potential

- Brisk global economic growth has benefited exporters, and their buoyancy will ultimately feed through to the domestic economy. Producers are likely to accelerate capital investment to revamp productivity through factory automation. In addition, increasing numbers of foreign visitors and a chronic labour shortage should stimulate capex by service sector. However, the adverse impact of a stronger yen and global economic deceleration will emerge in H2/18.
- On the consumer front, wage growth will remain lacklustre, despite the government's request for a 3% increase. Core CPI should hover in the neighbourhood of 1% as downward pressure from the stronger yen will not completely offset upward pressure from staffing shortages. Depressed real income will therefore continue to weigh on spending.

- Further appreciation of the yen
- Political confusion on the back of a number of scandals
- Geopolitical risks (tensions with North Korea)

China

- The economy looks more resilient than expected, with Q1 growth roughly stable, although credit slowed slightly more quickly recently.
- New property starts were stronger than expected, exports are holding up relatively well and consumption remains healthy, although infrastructure spending looks to have cooled somewhat.
- The CPI is back to the low end of the PBoC's comfortable range after seasonal swings.
- Signs of China's policy stance easing, including recent RRR cuts and messages from the latest Politburo meeting, seem to be offsetting potential downside risks ahead.
- Reforms look to be gathering speed. Following XI's speech in Boao, China revealed its timetables for opening up the financial and manufacturing markets further, which could also help ease tensions with the US.
- Despite recent rumblings over the US/China trade relationship, there are more signs for the two sides to talk.

Risk factors

- **Rumblings over the trade relationship with the US may continue. Keep an eye on US visits to Beijing in May**
- **Geopolitical noises regarding North Korea: keep an eye on North/South Korea Summit, and Trump/Kim Summit**
- **Policy mistakes in managing structural transition**

Asia (ex JP & CH)**India: still on an expansionary path**

- Economic activity in India is still on an expansionary trajectory, although lower than its January peak (partly driven by a favourable base effect). The weakest component is exports, which declined in March by 0.7 YoY. The agriculture seasonal production (rice, pulses and cereals) estimate has been revised up, following already very high levels reported one year ago.
- Credit dynamics have recently experienced some weakness, due to higher than usual demand and some supply issues (shortage of notes at the banks machines).
- Inflation keeps decelerating, due to food and vegetable prices. The March headline figure was reported at 4.3% YoY, while core inflation remains higher. The oil price is becoming more and more challenging for India. Current levels could threaten inflation and fiscal accounts.
- RBI is expected to be on hold over 2018. One more board member passed on a tighter stance, according the recent minutes.

- **The recovery has begun to moderate since February 2018**
- **March inflation still low**
- **RBI on hold**
- **The oil price becoming more and more challenging**

Latam**Brazil: preparing general elections**

- Brazil is preparing for general elections on October 7th 2018. April 7th was the deadline for the affiliation by potential candidates to a political party or to resign from executive branch positions in order to be able to run. Official registration will begin in July and will end on August 15th. There is a lot of uncertainty regarding the number of potential candidates, which can range from 11 to 16. There is also a small probability that Lula may be in the race, depending on the decision of the Electoral Supreme Court (the trial will begin on August 15th). The election landscape is fragmented and polarized.
- Compared with past elections, it seems like the focus has shifted away from the economy to other priorities such as corruption, crime and violence and health. The population seems to resent the establishment and to mistrust political institutions, favouring more "non-establishment" candidates.

- **The election landscape is fragmented and polarized**
- **On the October 7th the first round and on the 28th the second round**
- **Non-establishment candidates seem to be the favourites**

EMEA (Europe Middle East & Africa)**Russia: we are forecasting growth of 1.7% yoy for 2018-2019**

- Despite the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, we maintain our growth scenario unchanged. Indeed, even if the central bank had to pause in its cycle of falling rates, the rise in the price of oil at a high level is an important support of growth.

South Africa: we are forecasting growth of 2% yoy in 2018

- Growth surprised to the upside in 2017 (1.3% yoy) and short-term indicators are looking solid in early 2018. Inflation is continuing to slow and should allow the SARB to begin easing its monetary policy before long. The ongoing fiscal consolidation and recent political changes should have a positive impact on the economy.

Turkey: we are forecasting a slowdown in growth to 4.3% in 2018

- The base effects associated with the *coup d'État* and the end of Russian sanctions are likely to fade. Due to the increasing domestic and external imbalances (increased public and current account deficits) and geopolitical tensions, the Turkish lira will remain under pressure and continue to hamper the economy via imported inflation. This month, the central bank has finally raised one of its key rates in anticipation of the June elections that could weigh on the currency also.

- **Decreasing oil prices and increasing sanctions from US**
- **Less fiscal consolidation, lack of reforms**
- **Lax monetary policy, rising inflation and twin deficits, currency depreciation.**

Macro and Market forecasts

| Macroeconomic forecasts (9 May 2018) | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|------|------|-------------------------|------|------|
| Annual averages (%) | Real GDP growth % | | | Inflation (CPI, yoy, %) | | |
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| US | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.3 |
| Japan | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.1 |
| Eurozone | 2.5 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Germany | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| France | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| Italy | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
| Spain | 3.1 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| UK | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
| Brazil | 1.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 4.2 |
| Russia | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 4.1 |
| India | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.5 |
| Indonesia | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 |
| China | 6.9 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| Turkey | 7.3 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 11.1 | 10.8 | 9.5 |
| Developed countries | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Emerging countries | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| World | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 |

Source: Amundi Research

| Key interest rate outlook | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | 8/05/2018 | Amundi + 6m. | Consensus Q3 2018 | Amundi + 12m. | Consensus Q1 2019 |
| US | 1.75 | 2.00 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.50 |
| Eurozone | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Japan | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.10 |
| UK | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1.00 |

| Long rate outlook | | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| 2Y. Bond yield | | | | | |
| | 8/05/2018 | Amundi + 6m. | Forward + 6m. | Amundi + 12m. | Forward + 12m. |
| US | 2,52 | 2.20-2.40 | 2,76 | 2.50-2.70 | 2,88 |
| Germany | -0,58 | -0.60/-0.40 | -0,43 | -0.40/-0.20 | -0,30 |
| Japan | -0,13 | -0.20/-0.00 | -0,13 | -0.20/-0.00 | -0,12 |
| UK | 0,82 | 0.80/1.0 | 0,93 | 0.8/1.0 | 1,03 |

| 10Y. Bond yield | | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| | 8/05/2018 | Amundi + 6m. | Forward + 6m. | Amundi + 12m. | Forward + 12m. |
| US | 3.00 | 2.80/3.0 | 3.07 | 3/3.15 | 3.12 |
| Germany | 0.58 | 0.60/0.80 | 0.71 | 0.80/1.00 | 0.82 |
| Japan | 0.05 | 0 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.15 |
| UK | 1.48 | 1.40/1.60 | 1.64 | 1.40/1.60 | 1.72 |

| Currency outlook | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | 8/05/2018 | Amundi + 6m. | Consensus Q3 2018 | Amundi + 12m. | Consensus Q1 2019 |
| EUR/USD | 1.19 | 1.25 | 1.24 | 1.28 | 1.27 |
| USD/JPY | 110 | 105 | 108 | 105 | 106 |
| EUR/GBP | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 0.95 | 0.89 |
| EUR/CHF | 1.19 | 1.16 | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.20 |
| EUR/NOK | 9.63 | 9.50 | 9.40 | 9.30 | 9.20 |
| EUR/SEK | 10.37 | 9.70 | 10.03 | 9.50 | 9.75 |
| USD/CAD | 1.29 | 1.25 | 1.26 | 1.22 | 1.25 |
| AUD/USD | 0.74 | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.79 |
| NZD/USD | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.74 |
| USD/CNY | 6.37 | 6.30 | 6.42 | 6.30 | 6.46 |

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